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The Realism/Antirealism Debate in the Philosophy of Science

University of Konstanz, GERMANY, KOPS

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Title The Realism/Antirealism Debate in the Philosophy of Science
The Realism/Antirealism Debate in the Philosophy of Science
 
Creator Dudau, Radu
 
Subject Realismus
Antirealismus
Wissenschaftlicher Realismus
Realism
Antirealism
Scientific Realism
Philosophy
 
Description This is a defense of the doctrine of scientific realism (SR). SR is defined through
the following two claims:
(i) Most essential unobservables posited by the well-established current scientific
theories exist independently of our minds.
(ii) We know our well-established scientific theories to be approximately true.

I first offer positive argumentation for SR. I begin with the
so-called 'success arguments' for SR: 1) scientific
theories most of the times entail successful predictions; 2) science is
methodologically successful in generating empirically successful theories.
SR explains these facts via inference to the best explanation (IBE).

I combine Hacking's experimental argument for entity realism with
Salmon's common-cause principle. I take entity realism to be foundational
to SR: one may believe in the existence
of some theoretical entities without believing in any particular theory in which these are
embedded. Its motivation comes from experimental practice, where the manipulation of
these entities often relies on incompatible theoretical accounts.

The underdetermination (UD) topic is thereafter discussed. Several attempts to
distinguish between an observable and an unobservable realm are critically discussed,
as well as the possibility that for any given theory, there are
empirically equivalents generated by means of algorithms. I present
extensive argumentation to the effect that such algorithmic rivals are not to be taken
seriously.

Social constructivism (SC) is being critically treated. I proceed by distinguishing between
a metaphysical, a semantic, and an epistemic variant of SC. I conclude that only a
moderate metaphysical constructivism can stand on its own feet. Its claim
is merely that some facts about the world are socially constructed.

I finish with a plea for a selective SR, able to do justice to the presence
of both instrumentalism and modest constructivism in scientific practice.
 
Publisher Universit├Ąt Konstanz
Fachbereich Philosophie. Fachbereich Philosophie
 
Date 2002
 
Type Thesis.Doctoral
 
Format application/pdf
 
Identifier urn:nbn:de:bsz:352-opus-10328
http://kops.ub.uni-konstanz.de/volltexte/2003/1032/
 
Language eng
 
Rights http://kops.ub.uni-konstanz.de/doku/urheberrecht.php